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RISKY BUSINESS: MEDICARE'S VULNERABILI1Y TO 




As Congress accelerates the Medicare population's movement 
into managed care, Medicare's vulnerability to selection games by 
managed care providers looms as a serious problem for both the 
Treasury and the over-sixty-five population. This Article explores the 
significance and nature of that vulnerability to selection garnes, 
before· turning to what the government should do to counteract 
them. 
Medicare matters; Medicare managed care matters in particu-
lar} Medicare's costs expanded to $199 billion in fiscal year 1996 to 
about twelve percent of the federal budget.2 These costs will grow to 
$248 billion in 2001 and to $347 billion in 2006; only then will the 
steep phase of the increase begin when the Medicare demands of 
the "baby boom" generation start in 2010.3 
Congress began responding to these cost increases in the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA),4 using incentives to push the 
Medicare population' toward managed care and other methods of 
cost control.s Currently, Medicare represents the last large popula-
tion pool still predominantly receiving fee-for-service coverage and 
t B.A., 1974, Columbia University; J.D., 1977, Harvard Law School. Solicitor and 
Deputy General Counsel for the House of Representatives, 1984-1995; Profe!r 
sor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. 
tt B.S. in Nursing, 1995, University of Maryland; Student, University of Baltimore 
School of Law. The Authors would like to thank Emily R. Greenberg and her 
skilled staff for their library-computer assistance. 
I. See generally Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Consti-
tution in Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411 (1996). 
2. See Steve Langdon, With Campaign Dust Settling, Medicare Chances Brighter, 55 
CoNG. Q. WKLY. REp. 175, 179 (1997). 
3. See id.; Sf'R- also CoNGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., ECONOMIC AND BuDGET OUTLOOK: 
FISCAL YEARS 1998-2009 (1999). 
4. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4701, III Stat. 251, 489 
(1997) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13%u-2 to 13%u-v). 
5. SP.e Charles Tiefer, Treatment for Medicare's Budget: QJ.tick operation or Long-1'erm 
Care?, 16 ST. LoUIS U. PuB. L. REv. 27, 34-35 (1996). 
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moving like a glacier, slowly but on a vast scale, into managed care.6 
Accordingly, legal observers and courts7 have begun focusing on the 
problems faced by Medicare and the elderly as a result of this 
change. These problems include inadequate grievances and appeal 
procedures,9 patient dumping,1O and underutilization,l1 among other 
things. 12 
Part II of this Article concerns Medicare's vulnerability to man-
aged care provider selection games. 13 Managed care providers have 
every incentive to enroll healthier, less demanding beneficiaries and 
leave the program's more problematic beneficiaries unserved. That 
way lies profit. However, that way also leaves the federal government 
with increased cost and difficulty in arranging care for residual, 
problematic recipients. 14 It further leaves those problematic benefi-
ciaries caught between the disincentives that Congress, and rising 
health costs, will create for Medicare beneficiaries who fail to sign 
onto managed care and the agility of managed care providers in 
avoiding their enrollment. IS As a large part of the population comes 
6. See id. Traditionally, Medicare beneficiaries received fee-for-service coverage, 
simply going to the hospital or doctor of their choice, and sending the bill to 
the government. See Langdon, supra note 2, at 179. In 1999, only 15% of 
Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care plans. See Mary Agnes 
Carey, New Strategy, Old Disputes, 57 CONGo Q. WKLY. REp. 18, 19 (1999). By con-
trast, 85% of Americans with employer-based health insurance receive their 
medical care through managed care, with the plan defining the limits of the 
care they receive and their choice of hospital and doctor. See id. 
7. See Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1998). In a recent class ac-
tion suit, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
rulings regarding beneficiary requests for services must be made within a rea-
sonable time, and that such rulings must be written in type large enough for 
the beneficiaries to read. See id. 
8. See Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate En-
rollee Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 TENN. L. REv. 359, 
362-71 (1998). 
9. See Jess Alderman, Medicaid & Medicare: HCFA Must Monitor HMOs to Ensure A~ 
peal Rights for Medicare Beneficiaries, 26 lL. MED. & ETHICS 253, 254 (1998). 
10. See George P. Smith, II, Patient Dumping: Implications for the Elderly, 6 ELDER LJ. 
165, 166 (1998). 
11. Mary DuBois Krohn, Comment, The False Claims Act and Managed Care: Blowing 
the Whistle on Underutilization, 28 CUMB. L. REv. 443, 444 (1997-98). 
12. See Karen Visocan, Recent Changes in Medicare Managed Care: A Step Backwards for 
Consumers?, 6 ELDER LJ. 31, 32 (1998) (discussing the consumer protection 
problems associated with managed care). 
13. See discussion infra Part II. 
14. See Smith, supra note 10, at 166-74. 
15. See id. 
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to depend on the availability of Medicare-managed care providers 
for their health care, and sometimes their lives, the potential for 
burden-evading games by providers could strike justifiable fear in a 
sizeable percentage of Americans. 
Part III of this Article concerns what the government should 
do. Primarily, the government should institute and improve risk ad-
justment programs.16 These programs would adjust the payments to 
managed care providers so that they would only receive payment 
commensurate with the risks they take on.17 The creation ,of this di-
rect relationship between risk and payment requires addressing the 
argument that managed care providers function best in a free mar-
ketplace with less bureaucratic supervision, rather than with risk ad-
justment. Others argue the protections of the False Claims ActlS can 
be made to apply, thereby permitting the government to pursue 
wrongful managed care provider efforts to evade the risk adjust-
ment system based in fraud. '9 This proposal involves considering the 
argument that any such evasion falls short of fraud since it does not 
involve false billing for nonexistent beneficiaries or for services not 
rendered.20 
II. THE PROBLEM OF MANAGED CARE PROVIDER RISK-
SELECTION 
A. Medicare's Evolution 
As the largest public program for financing individual health 
care, Medicare has remained politically popular. Since the inception 
of Medicare provisions in 1965, as set forth under Title XVIII of the 
Social Security Act, this non-appropriated21 entitlement program has 
steadily increased in COSt.22 The growing elderly population and 
ever-increasing cost of health care account for this dramatic in-
crease.23 Preservation of Medicare's financial integrity relies on a 
16. See discussion infra Part III. 
17. See Leslie M. Greenwald et aI., Risk Adjustment for the Medicare Program: Lessons 
Learned from Research and Demonstrations, 35 INQUIRY 193 (Summer 1998). 
18. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1996). 
19. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
20. See infra notes 106-22 and accompanying text. 
21. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAw AND Poucy, 226-40 (2d ed. 
1998). 
22. See id. at 226-27. Program costs jumped from $7.1 million in 1970 to $70.7 mil-
lion in 1985 and to $156.5 billion in 1995, accounting for greater than 10% of 
the entire federal operating budget. See id. at 110. 
23. See Judith Feder & Marilyn Moon, Managed Care for the Elderly: A Threat or a 
Promise? (Managed Care and Older People: Issues and Experiences.), GENERATIONS, 
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two-fold process: cost reduction and revenue increase.24 A shift in 
Medicare administration from a fee-for-service (FFS) model to one 
of managed care is one viable option for obtaining cost 
reductions.25 
In the BBA, the 105th Congress supported a shift to Medicare 
managed care with the inclusion of provisions for the Health Care 
Finance Administration's (HCFA)26 "Medicare Choice."27 However, 
with the benefits of managed care comes the participation of Man-
aged Care Organizations (MCOs); their incentives, of course, lie in 
the direction of profit maximization.28 
The Medicare program's new Part "C," known as Medi-
care Choice,29 offers beneficiaries more options in the allocation of 
federal financing to their health care entitlement.3o Part C provides 
for a variety of private health plan choices for beneficiaries through 
MCOs categorized as Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs), Pro-
vider-sponsored Organizations (PSOs), and Medical Savings Ac-
counts (MSAs) , in addition to the continued traditional FFS op-
tion.31 The new regulations set forth a multitude of provisions 
June 22, 1998, at 4 available in 1998 WL 16365280. 
24. See Tiefer, supra note 5, at 29 ("The powerful support in the population for 
preserving Medicare as much as possible will forge a balance with the political 
opposition to the painful substantive steps of cost reduction and revenue in-
crease necessary for such preservation."). 
25. See id. 
26. The Health Care Finance Administration oversees the Medicare. program ad-
ministration under the Department of Health and Human Services, which in 
turn is overseen by Congress. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 21, at Ill. 
27. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
28. See Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care ~ra, 16 
HEALTH AFF. 34, 35 (Jan/Feb 1997). ' 
29. See 42 C.F.R. § 422 (1998). 
30. See HAVIGHURST. supra note 21, at 112. For a comprehensive outline of the cur-
rent Medicare Choice provisions, see Joe Baker, Medicare HMOs and the Medi-
care Choice Program, 85 (Practicing Law Institute New York Practice Handbook 
series No. F-18, 1998). 
31. See Sandra Christensen, Medicare Choice Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 
1997, 17 HEALTH AFF, 224, 224 (1998). PPOs are provider networks that im-
pose lower cost-sharing requirements on an enrollee who uses network provid-
ers as opposed to non-network providers. See id. PSOs are organizations of "af-
filiated health care providers that provide a substantial portion of services 
covered by a plan." /d. Generally, the affiliated health care,providers "have a 
m~jority financial interest in the PSO." ld. MSA~ offer enrollees a medical sav-
ings plan consisting of any excess of Medicare's capitation payment over their 
plan's annual premium, from which the benet1ciary may make non-taxable 
withdrawals for the purpose of paying out-of-pocket medical expenses. See id. 
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extending from MCO providership to beneficiary participation and 
the role of the government in each area of the program.32 
B. The Risk Selection ''Pitfall'' in Managed Care 
Studies on the existence and prevalence of risk selection have 
occurred since the inception of the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion (HMO), the preceptor to the growing managed care way of 
life.33 Statistics indicate that thirty percent of all health care spend-
ing is attributable to one percent of the total population.34 Though 
payor-sponsored data suggests that Medicare beneficiaries enrolled 
in managed care plans are satisfied with their health care cover-
age,35 the presence of risk selection, also called '~nrollment" or '~e­
lection bias," is strongly supported in the medicalliterature.36 Advo-
cates for the elderly have also recognized selection bias as a major 
factor facing the Medicare population in obtaining adequate health 
care coverage and access to care.37 
As a result of this research, both the medical and legal commu-
nities have acknowledged that selection bias is a significant issue in 
predicting cost and health care outcomes for managed care recipi-
ents, not only in regard to Medicare beneficiaries but also to health 
care consumers as a whole.38 The HCFA's inadequate consideration 
of the possibility that provider plans may manage a disproportionate 
number of older, more ill beneficiaries is also accountable for poor 
cost management issues.39 
at 224-25. 
32. See 42 C.ER. § 422 (1998). 
33. See generaUy, Fred J. Hellinger, Selection Bias in Health Maintenance Organizations: 
Analysis of Recent Evidence, 9 HEALTH CARE FIN. REv. 55, 58-60 (1987) (discuss-
ing the rise in HMO enrollment and the research on HMOs that demon-
strates a high rate of'selection bias). 
34. See Thomas L. Greaney, How Many Libertarians Does It Take to Fix the Health Cam 
System?, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1825, 1832 (1998) (book review). 
35. See Steven Brostoff, PoUs Show Public is Satisfied with Managed Cam, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER, Sept. 25, 1995, at 16. 
36. See Robert O. Morgan et aI., The Medicare-HMO Revolving Dour-The Healthy Go 
In and the Sick Go Out, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 169, 169-75 (1997); see also 
Jonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Cam and Medicam Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL., 
POL'y & L. 595, 605-07 (1997); Katherine Swartz, Risk Selection and Medi-
cam Choice: Bewam, INQUIRY, Summer 1998, at 101, 101-03. 
37. See Feder & Moon, supra note 23, at 4. 
38. See, e.g., Oberlander, supra note 36, at 604-07 (explaining how HMO cost con-
trols affect the quality of care received by HMO beneficiaries and that selec-
tion bias is one such cost control). 
39. See generaUy 144 CONGo REc. S12, 274-76 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement of 
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Risk selection occurs in two ways, both of which have a signifi-
cant effect on the payment scheme of Medicare. The first type of 
risk selection occurs when beneficiaries "shop around" for the man-
aged care plan that best meets their medical needs.40 For example, 
beneficiaries may seek optimal managed care coverage for their 
health care needs, then disenroll back into the FFS sector seeking 
more services when their health deteriorates, and re-enroll into 
managed care once their increased care needs subside.41 Relatively 
healthy recipients are more willing to change health care providers 
or plans than ill individuals who have developed a therapeutic rela-
tionship with their providers.42 Long-term safeguards against this 
type of selective enrollment, by way of "lock-in" provisions, are dis-
cussed later in this Article.43 
The second type of selection bias-the one of most concern 
here-occurs due to actions by MCOs.44 This concept involves 
targeting the healthy elderly population for enrollment, who are 
less likely to utilize expensive health care services.45 Capitated pro-
spective payment46 to the MCOs for healthy beneficiaries using 
fewer services logically results in more profit. There are several 
means by which MCOs have taken advantage of the ability to prac-
tice selective enrollment. It is believed that selection bias by benefi-
ciaries encourages these efforts by managed care to enroll low-risk 
beneficiaries.47 
Senator Frist) (supporting the managed care industry's position that delayed 
planning of a payment scheme aimed at reducing risk selection, complicated 
and lengthy regulations, and inappropriate "punishment" legislation bear 
some responsibility for cost concerns and other issues facing the monumental 
Medicare transition). 
40. See HAVIGHURST, supra note 21, at 264; see also Morgan, supra note 36, at 170; 
Swartz, supra note 36, at 101. 
41. See Morgan, supra note 36, at 174 (concluding that ill individuals tend to move 
out of managed care). 
42. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (citing literature concluding that "all 
'health plans which restrict an enrollee's choice of provider (i.e., HMOs and 
exclusive provider organizations) attract relatively healthy individuals' H). 
43. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
44. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607. 
45. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 101. This strategy appears to be working quite well 
for HMOs. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (noting that beneficiaries 
who enroll in HMOs tend to be significantly healthier than those in FFS and 
are therefore less likely to need medical care). 
46. See Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 193-209 (describing the evolution of 
capitated and prospective payment in Medicare). 
47. See id. at 194. 
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One major culprit in the area of selective plan enrollment is 
that of marketing strategies implemented in transitioning ~edicare 
to the managed care arena.48 Managed care marketing to Medicare 
recipients is direct, unlike insurer marketing for corporate or busi-
ness health care contracts for employees.49 The latter allows insurers 
to target employers with low-risk employees, while using strategies to 
seek Medicare enrollees that are in the low-risk category of exces-
sive health care expenditure.5o While marketing by managed care 
plans is specifically addressed by the HCFA regulations,51 there are 
no minimum marketing requirements that assure dissemination of 
program information to known high-risk geographic communities, 
nor are there requirements regarding the advertisement of specific 
types of programs offered by the managed care plans. 52 It is feasible 
that plans would only offer programs focusing on well populations, 
even if the plans were voluntarily presented in high-risk geographic 
areas. High-risk geographic areas include primarily urban neighbor-
hoods in which there is likely to be a higher per capita rate of re-
cipients with chronic, costly health care needs.53 The HCFA's provi-
sions in the Medicare Choice rule are currently insufficient for 
protecting Medicare beneficiaries and the program from the costly 
effects of selective enrollment. 
III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO RISK SELECTION 
A. Selection Bias by Medicare Beneficiaries 
Reverse selection bias-bias practices by the enrollee-will re-
-main an issue under the BBA and the Medicare Choice provisions 
that allow .recipients nearly unlimited disenrollment rights for the 
first several years after the rule's enactmentY This benefit, however, 
48. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607 (chronicling the competition among 
health insurance plans to sign up the best risk enrollees and their marketing 
strategies to target the best risk population). 
49. See itt. at 608. 
50. See· id. (discussing strategies such as face-to-face meetings and direct telephone 
marketing practices which enable the proVider to investigate a potential en-
rollee's health status and either encourage or discourage enrollment based on 
the risk factor analysis). 
51. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (1998) (requiring that all marketing materials be ap-
proved by HCFA prior to distribution in providership communities and that 
beneficiaries in the same geographic area each receive the same information 
regarding plan offerings and benefits). 
52. See id. 
53. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
54. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.62, 422.66 (1998) (stating that through 2001, the number 
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becomes significantly limited when the same proVlSlons mandate a 
restriction by a "lock-in" period of enrollment that is to begin in 
the year 2002.55 Recipients tend to enroll in managed care plans 
while their health needs are few, but disenroll when they escalate.56 
They dis enroll in favor of plans offering additional Medicare cover-
age, or the FFS sector, and return to lesser-providing MCOs when 
their acute health issues subside and their needs decline.57 
The future Medicare Choice limitations prevent enrollees from 
"plan jumping" in search of better coverage by locking them into 
one plan for a longer period of time and restricting the opportunity 
for disenrollment and re-enrollment into other plan options.58 
These long-term limitations allow for better prospective cost analy-
ses and a more effective use of the risk adjustment model in deter-
mining a payment scheme for Medicare managed care as a whole.59 
B. Selection Bias by Managed Care Providers 
Aside from reverse risk selection, MCO selection bias practices 
raise significant concerns for the financial welfare of the Medicare 
program and, more importantly, the medical welfare of the nation's 
growing elderly population. Just as "lock-in" provisions are antici-
pated to reduce risk selection by beneficiaries, there will also be a 
favorable reduction of MCO-biased selection activities.60 However, 
Medicare's exposure to these practices will continue due to several 
other mechanisms employed by MCOs that are not adequately ad-
dressed by the current regulations.61 
For example, as previously noted, selective marketing is a major 
of elections or changes that a Medicare Choice individual may make is not 
limited); see also Baker, supra note 30, at 89; Christensen, supra note 31, at 
229. 
55. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 422.62, 422.66 (1998) (explaining that after 2002, individuals 
may change plans or disenroll, but that either decision may be made only 
once during the first six months of the year). 
56. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
57. See Morgan, supra note 36, at 174. 
58. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
59. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 229 (discussing the effect that the open en-
rollment procedures will have in making selective marketing by the MCOs 
more difficult). But see id. (predicting also that selection bias on behalf of en-
rollees will continue to occur even after lock-in due to plan options, particu-
larly MSAs). 
60. See id. (noting that the new open-enrollment procedures will tend to reduce 
favorable selection among new enrollees). 
61. See id. 
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method of managed care provider selection.62 One suggested solu-
tion is the inclusion of centralized marketing provisions.63 Such reg-
ulations would restrict providers from directly communicating with 
prospective enrollees, make favorable risk selection more difficult, 
standardize program information to all beneficiaries regardless of 
geographic location, and provide more reasonable protection 
against abusive and fraudulent marketing practices.64 Development 
of standard policies to which benefit information packages must 
conform65 and setting standards by which benefits can be measured 
are other options to ensure the unbiased marketing of the managed 
care product.66 The concept of standardized benefits packages is not 
new nor is it exclusively beneficial to the new Medicare system.67 
Th~ inability of potential managed care recipients to fully com-
prehend these confusing options also raises concerns.68 It is fre-
quently those recipients with the greatest health care needs that are 
unable to make appropriate health plan choices in light of this con-
fusion.69 There is an absence of clear provisions offering personal 
62. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text. 
63. See Oberlander,. supra note 36, at 620. 
64. See id. at 620-21.·A standardized plan comparison of benefits, premiums, and 
cost-sharing-similar to that used by the Federal Employees Health Benefit 
Program-is suggested. See id. Professor Oberlander also calls for automatic 
inclusion of physician and financial plan incentive information in a central-
ized marketing package as a means of further reducing selection bias that oc-
curs when assertive, educated enrollees make other health plan choices after 
requesing this additional information from the prospective provider. See id. 
Current regulations require only that this information be distributed upon re-
quest. See id. at 621. 
65. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.80 (1998). HCFA currently requires only that managed care 
providers provide enrollees with basic benefits information. See id. No stand-
ardization of plan information is specified. See id. 
66. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 102. Implementing such standards will prevent 
"tailoring" . of benefits packages to healthier individuals, make recipient~ bet-
ter able to compare costs of various plans, and prevent false advertising by the 
insurer. See id. 
67. See id. Medigap policies were required' by Congress to conform to 10 uniform 
benefit packages, as mandated by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990. See id. This legislative change was made t9 address similar issues of con-
sumer confusion and risk-selection that arise between Medicare beneficiaries 
and HMOs. See id. 
68. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228; Swartz, supra note 36, at 102. 
69. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228 (observing that enrollees will face a "be-
wildering array" of options and that "[m]aking appropriate health plan 
chokes unassisted may be beyond the ability of some enrollees, especially 
those who are impaired by disability, age, illness, poverty, or lack of educa-
328 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 28 
assistance to needy beneficiaries in making these complicated 
choices.70 Implementation of standardized benefits packages is one 
way to assure dissemination of necessary information.7 ! An addi-
tional regulation can provide for impartial adjutant services that 
must remain independent from managed care responsibilities in the 
enrollment process. This service should allow for one-on-one com-
munication with an appointed assistant whose scope of responsibil-
ity would be limited to providing sufficient and timely managed 
plan information regarding benefits, premiums, and cost sharing re-
quirements, in comparison to those for the FFS sector. Additional 
provisions for more specific ombudsperson services would also ben-
efit the program as a whole, assisting in establishing trust within the 
vulnerable elderly population. 
Health care provider incentives and influences are a third con-
sideration in the selection bias dilemma.72 Due to the fact that 
Medicare beneficiaries depend on their past and present physicians 
for guidance in decision making, there has always been a danger 
that managed care providers will use incentives to influence physi-
cians to give advice that is more in the interest of the MCa than 
the patient. The HCFA already has fairly comprehensive regulations 
with regard to limitations on how and to what extent managed care 
administrators can compensate physicians for keeping medical ex-
penditures of enrollees down.73 The medical community has turned 
to the managed care industry for a response to the criticisms of 
poor enrollee care and management, claiming that a lack of fiduci-
ary ethics within the industry is responsible for these concerns.74 
tion H). 
70. See id.; see also Swartz, supra note 36, at 101. Focus groups participating in 
HCFA infonnation package testing reported great confusion. See id. An antici-
pated percentage of elderly with memory or mental impainnent, and vision 
or hearing difficulties account for a significant senior population in need of 
assistance with decision-making. See id. 
71. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 102. 
72. See Gray, supra note 28, at 45; see also Oberlander, supra note 36, at 600, 603. 
73. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.208 (1998) (defining requirements and limitations of physi-
cian incentive plans). 
74. Noting the absence of an ethical orientation by organizational health care 
providers, the American Medical Association (AMA) supports the develop-
ment of ethical standards within the industry and an increase in physician 
control within the organizations. See Gray, supra note 28, at 37-38 (encourag-
ing the establishment of non-profit managed care groups is another sugges-
tion). 
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Beyond the physician-client and physician-MCO influence ques-
tion are the concerns of indirect selection bias attributed to man-
aged care affiliate decisions at the corporate level. While Provider 
Service Organization75 and MCO provisions exist, the same regula-
tions fail to address the significant influence on selective enrollment 
that managed care groups have when choosing their affiliating hos-
pitals, physicians, and specialty service contract providers.76 Un-
doubtedly, networking of providers and centers occurs, typically ori-
ented to an overall healthy population. For example, community 
hospitals and centers catering to the healthier middle and upper 
class are more likely to be sought as network providers over urban 
teaching facilities that provide a large percentage of indigent care, 
which is often associated with consumers requiring increased health 
services at a substantially greater cost per capita.77 Health care con-
sumers with multiple or chronic requirements tend to be associated 
with larger, multi-service-providing institutions and will likely opt for 
FFS care when they experience difficulty in finding an MCO who 
contracts with their current, multiple-specialty providers.78 
This system of manipulation has been linked to the need for 
increased and ongoing quality monitoring.19 However, hypothesizing 
a legislative solution is difficult. The Medicare Choice rule ad-
dresses monitoring of managed care client data,80 but determining 
what measures and data would be most useful in formulating solu-
tions requires more time.81 One possible solution is to initiate regu-
lations providing for specific minimum service standards that assure 
availability of any specialty care programs required by health care 
consumers, either through direct or indirect provider provisions . 
. Examples include mental health services and more traditional medi-
cal program needs, such as diabetic care and rehabilitation services. 
Mandating such services, in addition to existing programs targeted 
at preventative health care and the well population, standardizes all 
75. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.350 (1998) (defining Provider Service Organization as a pri-
vate or public entity that is organized by a group of affiliated providers). 
76. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103. 
77. Compare Bryan A. Lang, Understanding and Applying Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Methods in Modern Medicine Conflicts, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 406, 406 (1998), with Edi-
torial, Indigent Care Rigid Law Burdens Urban County Hospitals, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998, at 14A. 
78. See Oberlander, supra note 36, at 607. 
79. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103. 
80. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.257 (1998). 
81. See Swartz, supra note 36, at 103. 
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managed care program benefits. This standardization would result 
in a reduction not only in MCO"selection bias, but also reverse se-
lection bias by high-risk enrollees whose population would be more 
evenly dispersed among provider groups within a geographic area. 
Successful implementation of this type of program includes the util-
ization of the centralized marketing model previously discussed.82 
With these minimum program and marketing provisions in place, 
the area risk adjustment can be reasonably addressed as the next 
logical aid in reducing selection bias by managed care providers. 
Perhaps most important, Medicare must adjust what it pays 
managed care providers. Until now, Medicare has paid provider or-
ganizations on a basis that ignores the different risks and needs of a 
diverse pool of beneficiaries. The principle of adjusted average per 
capita cost (AAPCC),83 a means by which Medicare costs for fee-for-
service recipients were to be reduced by five percent upon their 
transition into a managed care plan, is included in the BBA as part 
of a "risk adjustment" plan.84 Implementation of a new risk adjust-
ment factor5 should more adequately account for the selection bias 
by managed care providers that had previously resulted in a six to 
eight percent increase in cost, instead of the anticipated five per-
cent reduction for recipients enrolled in Medicare managed care 
plans.86 Medicare financial examiners have long addressed risk ad-
justment as a primary solution to risk selection87 and reliance on it 
remains unfettered.88 Risk adjustment counterbalances risks associ-
ated with health care provisions in high-risk geographic areas by 
82. See supra notes 6:ui7 and accompanying text. 
83. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225. AAPCC is a method by which Medi-
care's capitation rates were set at 95% of expected program costs under the 
FFS management and was figured for similar beneficiaries residing in the 
same county. See id. 
84. See ilL 
85. See id.; Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 194. The current risk adjusters used 
in reimburse-ment rate calculations are age, sex, institutional status, concur-
rent Medicaid enrollment, and employment status with regard to employ-
ment-based insurance. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225. The BBA will im-
plement a "health status" adjustment factor by the year 2000. See id. 
86. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 230 n.3 (citing a Congressional Budget Of-
fice memorandumand other sources that demonstrate an increased payment 
rate for HMOs over the FFS sector); see also Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, 
at 194-95 (finding the HMO overpayment range to be anywhere from 5-20%, 
resulting from selection bias). 
87. See Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 193. 
88. See id. at 202·07 (discussing HCFA's long-term interest in risk adjustment data 
and implimentation). 
1999] Medicare's Vulnerability to Selection Games 331 
providing a mechanism for an alternative reimbursement system to 
corporate care providers who agree to serve such communities, be-
yond the capitated rates set through the AAPCC formula. 89 Histori-
cally, risk adjustment-based payment planning has resulted in varia-
bility in reimbursement rates that managed care providers 
determined too risky in allowing them to predict profits on an an-
nual basis, thereby discouraging plan offerings in these high-risk 
communities.90 These decreased offerings ~in high-risk communities 
are due in part to the weaknesses of current demographic risk ad-
justers in explaining individual beneficiary variations in cost.91 
The BBA lacks specific provisions for the immediate determina-
tion and implementation of a health status adjuster.92 Currently, the 
addition of a non-specified health status adjuster by the BBA is 
slated for the year 2000,93 bringing with it the expectation that reim-
bursement for enrollee health care in excess of the capitated rates 
will reduce the avoidance of the medically needy by MCa plans, 
thereby further minimizing selection bias practices.94 The benefit 
sought by legislators of Medicare reform is the reduction of capita-
tion rates 'in relation to FFS per capita costs.95 
Minimum regulations, centralization of marketing practices, 
standardization of benefits, and specialty service provisions are four 
possible initiatives for tackling the prevalence of selection bias. Con-
straints on providership incentives and implementation of indepen-
dent enrollee assistance services are equally important. Moreover, 
the internal development of fiduciary ethical standards by the man-
aged care industry is a prerequisite to successful management of the 
selection bias' issue.96 
Only after the appropriate management of these accountable 
practices is dealt with can implementation of risk adjustments be in-
itiated with hopes at minimizing whatever selection bias remains. AI-
89. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225-26 (discussing the AAPCC and the effect 
of the BBA-proposed blended rates and floors on the provision of care in geo-
graphic areas at high risk for variable payment); see also Greenwald et aI., 
supra note 17, at 193-95 (discussing the risk adjustment formula). 
90. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 226; see also Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, 
at 194. 
91. See supra note 85. 
92. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 229-30. 
93. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.256(d) (1998) (providing only that a health adjuster will be 
added by HCFA, effective January 1, 2000). 
94. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 228. 
95. See id. at 227. 
96. See generally Gray, supra note 28, at 38-41. 
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though risk adjustment processes have been substantially investi-
gated,97 closer monitoring of the effects of risk selection strategies 
on managed care practices and costs is still required. There are 
measures worth implementing, modeled on the extant scattered 
provisions, directed toward providing sanctions for violations in care 
provision and prohibiting specific practices.98 
Managed care providers may well oppose or criticize the institu-
tion of risk adjustment reform by the HCFA. The industry and some 
members of Congress have consistently criticized efforts by the 
HCFA at directing managed care as involving too much bureau-
cratic supervision99 instead of the preferred solution of trusting the 
market. 100 
A major concern of the managed care business surrounds the 
time frame in which health factors are incorporated into the adjust-
ment formula. Managed care providers doubt the HCFA's ability to 
collect sufficient and timely diagnostic client data to enable them to 
mandate reasonable risk adjustment. 101 From the beneficiaries' per-
spective, such data may not be collected in time to prevent their ex-
clusion by specific plans that have met the already reduced mini-
mum enrollment requirements lO2 established by the regulations. 103 
The legislative record over the past fifteen years and the 
HCFA's ensuing regulation support pressing ahead with full-scale 
risk adjustment. Fifteen years ago, the HCFA engaged in little pric-
ing supervision of providers, and health care cost inflation drove 
Medicare costs up at incredibly high rates. In a legislative and regu-
latory revolution, Congress enacted and HCFA regulate~ a system of 
prospective pricing, first for hospital care and then for physician 
97. See grmeraUy Greenwald et al., supra note 17, at 195-97. 
98. See 42 C.F.R. § 422.110 (1998) (stating explicitly that discrimination against 
beneficiaries is prohibited, but providing no sanctions). 
99. See 144 CoNG. REc., S12275 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement of Senator 
Frist). 
100. See Mary Agnes Carey, Managed Care Overhaul Shows New Signs of Life, 57 CoNG. 
Q WKLY. REp. 129, 134 Gan. 16, 1999). 
101. See Christensen, supra note' 31, at 230; see also Greenwald et a!., supra note 17, 
at 202-03 (outlining the duties and requirements placed on the Department 
of Health and Human Services). 
102. The BBA effectively eliminates the "fifty-fifty" rule that previously required 
50% enrollment of commercially insured recipients (non-Medicaid/Medicare) 
by managed care plans, and reduces the minimum enrollment requirements 
for PSOs. See Christensen, supra note 31, at 225. 
103. See 42 C.F.R. § 422 (1998). 
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care. 104 The Medicare "market," which is distorted by the govern-
ment "footing" of the bill and the general lack of protection of or-
dinary market economics for health care consumers, would not 
have worked without that regulatory revolution. !Os Initially, risk ad-
justment, like prospective pricing, will be instituted on a rush basis 
with less-than-ideal datalO6 and with industry complaints of insuffi-
cient time to adjust. However, like prospective pricing, time will po-
lish its rough edges and make it seem, in retrospect, an inevitable 
necessity. 
C. Applying the False Claims Act to Managed Care Risk Selection 
The previous suggestions may be insufficient because of power-
ful incentives for managed care providers to improve their profit 
position by selecting lower-risk Medicare beneficiaries. Even a risk 
adjustment system depends on a degree of good faith cooperation 
from providers. 107 Managed care providers could furnish inaccurate 
information to the HCFA, reporting that they are assuming more 
risk than they actually are, just as health service providers have sub-
mitted false information that they provide more valuable services 
than they actually do-what is commonly known as "upcoding." On 
the other hand, providers may furnish truthful information, yet seek 
preferred risks, in ways not caught by the relatively simple risk ad-
justment data sets.108 Given the prevalence of fraud in federally-
reimbursed health care,l09 not to expect such abuses is somewhat 
optimistic, if not naive. 
In federal health care programs, the emerging legal check on 
such problems has become the False Claims Act,11O among other 
fraud and abuse statutes.1I1 The False Claims Act allows the Depart-
104. See Tiefer, supra note 1, at 450. 
105. See id. 
106. See Greenwald et aI., supra note 17, at 207. 
107. See generally PAMELA H. BuCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL. CML. AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAw (1996). 
108. See generally MALCOLM K SPARROW. LICENSE TO STEAL: WHY FRAUD PLAGUES 
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYsTEM (1996). 
109. See id. 
110. See generally David J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Fire-
power is Aimed at Health Care Fraud, 4 ANNALS HEALTH L. 127 (1995). 
111. For discussions of the anti-kickback laws, see generally James F. Blumstein, The 
Fraud and Abuse Statute in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health 
Care SPeakeasy, 22 AM. lL. & MED. 205 (1996); see also Francis H. Hearn, Jr., 
Curing the Health Care Industry: Government Response to Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 
5 l CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 175 (1989). 
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ment of Justice to sue those who make false claims, including Medi-
care care providers,1I2 for such abuses as fraudulent billing, misstate-
ments of utilization,l13 and false claims about the quality of health 
care rendered. 1l4 Moreover, under the Act's qui tam provisions, pri-
vate individuals-"whistleblowers"-can file suit on behalf of the 
Treasury for recovery, collecting a portion of the proceeds of ·the 
judgment or settlement as a reward. ll5 
To assure that the False Claims Act applies to the risk adjust-
ment context, HCFA should require managed care providers to for-
ward certifications in order to receive payment. The certifications 
can simply concern the accuracy of the risk adjustment data, or 
could more broadly oblige the MCO to certify that it has disclosed 
any pattern or practice which would operate to distort the statistical 
validity of the risk adjustment system. In effect, such certifications 
shift the burden from the government to the managed care pro-
vider of surfacing provider game-playing in the risk adjustment 
process. 
Managed care providers could raise several objections to such a 
policing mechanism. First, they could complain that it adds to the 
burdens of bureaucratic supervision, reporting, and red tape, the 
excessive penalties and intrusiveness of certification requirements 
and the False Claims Act remedy. This argument comes down to 
weighing the dangers in the risk adjustment process against the bur-
dens on the managed care providers. 
Second, the managed care providers could argue that, absent 
gross and crude fraud, the government suffers no concrete harm. 
Obviously, fraud cheats the Medicare program, but managed care 
providers can point out that they may face investigation, litigation, 
and liability for risk selection approaches far from gross and crude. 
112. See Gregory T. Jaeger & Jonathan L. Diesenhaus, Fractious Fraud Fights, LEGAL 
TIMES, Oct. 21, 1996, at 832; see also Christopher A. Myers & Michael L. Marti-
nez, Looking Closely at Doctors' Bills, Legal Times, Mar. 4, 1996, at 826-27. 
113. See Carolyn J. Paschke, The Qui Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The 
Statute in Current FQT7TI, Its History and Its Unique Position to Influence the Health 
Care Industry, 9 J.L. & HEALTH 163, 169-70, 177-78, 180 (1994-95). 
114. See David C. Hsia, Application of Qui Tam to the Quality of Health Care, 14 J. LE· 
GAL MED. 301, 302 (1993); see also Michael M. Mustokoff et aI., The Govern-
ment's Use of the Civil False Claims Act to EnJarce Standards of Quality of Care: Inge-
nuity ar the Heavy Hand of the BOO-Pound Carilla, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 137, 141 
(1997). 
115. See Gretchen L. Forney, Note, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the 
Government and the Relatar Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1357, 
1383 n.159 (1998). 
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Suppose, for example, the marketing methods of managed care 
providers "inadvertently" have some "subtle" selection effect, not 
consciously intended, and not showing up on HCFA's risk adjust-
ment factor set. This would not involve any out-and-out intentional 
falsification of data provided to the government, but moreover, the 
provider could argue that the government suffers no real harm. Af-
ter all, the managed care provider furnishes the services it claims to 
provide and the government pays the fee for such services. 
Similar arguments have occurred elsewhere regarding the appli-
cation of the False Claims Act, and Congress has not imposed any 
higher state-of-mind requirements or proof burdens. 116 The issue is 
whether the statute should apply in what managed care providers 
term the absence of "actual harm," where the provider actually pro-
vides the services it claims, and without actually engaging in false 
billing, finds ways to get around Medicare's inevitably simplified and 
limited risk adjustment system. 
The courts have begun addressing situations where the pro-
vider does render the services billed for, but evades some aspect of 
the government's regu!atory requirements. Notably, in United States 
ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,117 Columbia 
Healthcare had billed for Medicare services actually provided. I IS It 
merely violated Stark laws regarding improper incentives to physi-
cians who referred its patients. 1I9 Columbia argued that the viola-
tion of such regulations did not amount to a false claim where it ac-
tually furnished the services. 120 The district court agreed with 
Columbia, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. 121 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that if the government would 
not pay for Stark non-compliant services, then falsely certifying com-
pliance with the Stark requirements, was a false claim. 122 
More generally, there are several ways to conceptualize the ap-
propriateness of imposing certification requirements and False 
Claims Act penalties to back up the risk adjustment system. The 
purpose of the Medicare program, including the risk adjustment 
system, is not merely to buy a set amount of services. Rather, the 
116. See United States ex reL Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 
F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997). 
117. 125 F.3d 899 (1997). 
118. See id. at 901. 
119. See id. at 900 n.1. 
120. See id. at 900, 902. 
121. See id. at 902. 
122. See id. 
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program aims to provide for the health care needs of the Medicare 
beneficiary population, which requires effective statistical distribu-
tion of the coverage risks. A provider who gives actual services, but 
plays games with the distribution of coverage risks, deprives the gov-
ernment of what it seeks to buy.123 The nation will increasingly pay 
out a sizeable portion of its federal government funds to purchase 
Medicare managed care coverage for its aged. This country cannot 
accept not getting what it is paying for. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The enormous scale of Medicare costs in coming years makes 
the movement of the Medicare beneficiary population into man-
aged care one of the largest public law developments of our time. 124 
The authority enacted by Congress for the Health Care Finance Ad-
ministration falls short in significant ways that allow participating 
managed care providers the. means for manipulating the system for 
financial gain, without providing the necessary protections for pro-
gram recipients. 125 Implementation of risk adjustment principles, 
though necessary, does not suffice. No single adjustment factor can 
treat the infirmities of the health care system.126 Whether shoring it 
up by vigorous implementation of fraud sanctions might help 
enough as to the risk selection problem is an open question. 
Medicare has evolved rapidly. Given the public reluctance to 
radically change Medicare's economics by cutting benefits or by rais-
ing dedicated taxes, Medicare can use every sensible reform that 
will make its funds go as far as possible. The reform discussed in 
this article would be a start. 
123. For a fuller treatment of these issues, see Charles Tiefer & Michael Blumen-
feld, Qui Tam Recovery Without ''Actual Damages," 6 FALSE ClAIMS Acr & QUI 
TAM Q REv., July 1996, at 23. 
124. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. 
125. See supra Part II. 
126. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text. 
